[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":35},["ShallowReactive",2],{"post-data-secrets-in-docker-images-stolen-in-seconds":3},{"post":4,"relatedPosts":19},{"id":5,"title":6,"content":7,"hashtags":8,"coverImage":15,"createdAt":16,"updatedAt":16,"seoTitle":17,"seoDescription":18},"qgb2f8q8tiq3RIxah5bv","Secrets in Docker Images Are Stolen in Seconds: How to Keep Keys Out of Your Layers","\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>I\u003C\u002Fstrong>n a honeypot study presented at ACM CCS, bots used a decoy AWS key 7.86 seconds after the Docker Hub image that contained it was published. The median was 51.19 seconds, and all 100 planted AWS keys were used within 15 minutes. If a real key has ever shipped inside a public image, even briefly, treat it as compromised. Revoke it first, then review what it did, then rebuild the image without it. The lasting fix is to keep secrets out of images entirely and inject them when the container starts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>I did not reproduce the study. Everything below about its results comes from the reporting linked at the end. The Docker steps are standard practice, and the Ennote steps follow our documentation as I read it on November 19, 2026.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"what-the-study-measured\">What the study measured\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Two Stony Brook University researchers, Billy Tsouvalas and Nick Nikiforakis, published 300 honeypot images across eight public container registries over four months, according to \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com\u002Fnews\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcloud-keys-leaked-in-docker-hub-images-are-stolen-within-seconds\u002F\">BleepingComputer's report\u003C\u002Fa> from November 17, 2026. They contained AWS, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys, plus decoy SSH and database credentials. The paper is titled \"Gone in 8 Seconds: Uncovering Malicious Bots Operating on Public Container Registries.\"\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ctable>\n\u003Cthead>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Cth>Measure\u003C\u002Fth>\n\u003Cth>Result\u003C\u002Fth>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003C\u002Fthead>\n\u003Ctbody>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>Image pulls\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>more than 75,000\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>API calls on planted AWS keys\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>more than 140,000, from 5,000 unique IP addresses\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>Fastest first use of an AWS key\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>7.86 seconds after publication\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>Median time to first AWS call\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>51.19 seconds\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>AWS keys used within 15 minutes\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>all 100\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003Ctr>\n\u003Ctd>OpenAI and Anthropic keys\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003Ctd>used to exhaust the balances of the test accounts\u003C\u002Ftd>\n\u003C\u002Ftr>\n\u003C\u002Ftbody>\n\u003C\u002Ftable>\n\u003Cp>Two details change how you should respond:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>The bots mostly read layers, not run containers.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Almost nobody started the images. Scanners pulled them and inspected the layers directly. So \"we never run it as root\" or \"the entrypoint overwrites that file\" does not help: the key is in the layer.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Docker Hub drew nearly all the AWS activity\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and Harbor also saw some abuse. One caveat from me: 300 fresh honeypot images with controlled keys say nothing about how many real public images contain secrets, and a real leaked key may be found faster or slower than these times.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>The researchers reported the problem to Docker in May. Per BleepingComputer, they got only an acknowledgment, and an August test showed no platform change. Waiting for the registry to protect you is not a plan.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"how-keys-end-up-in-images\">How keys end up in images\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Most of these leaks are mundane. The usual paths:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Ccode>COPY . .\u003C\u002Fcode> copies a \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> file or a cloud credentials file into the image.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Ccode>ENV API_KEY=...\u003C\u002Fcode> or \u003Ccode>ARG API_KEY=...\u003C\u002Fcode> in the Dockerfile. Both are recorded in image metadata and layers, and anyone who can pull the image can read them with \u003Ccode>docker history\u003C\u002Fcode> or by unpacking it.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>A \u003Ccode>RUN\u003C\u002Fcode> step that writes a key to a file and a later step that deletes it. The deletion adds a new layer on top, and the earlier layer still contains the file.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>A token passed at build time and left in a build cache or in a pushed intermediate image.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"if-a-key-shipped-in-an-image-response-order\">If a key shipped in an image: response order\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>I'd do these in this order, and I would not wait to confirm that the image was scraped.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Col>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Make the image private or delete the tag.\u003C\u002Fstrong> This stops new pulls. It does not undo pulls that already happened, so do not stop here.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Revoke the key at the provider.\u003C\u002Fstrong> For AWS, deactivate or delete the access key; for OpenAI or Anthropic, delete the key in the provider console. Create the replacement after the old key is dead, not before. This happens at the provider, and no secret manager can do it for you.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Review what the key did.\u003C\u002Fstrong> On AWS, look at your CloudTrail history for that key ID, and check for new IAM users, access keys, roles or running instances that you did not create. For AI providers, open the usage and billing pages for spikes.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Find every other secret in the same image.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Unpack it and look at all layers, not only the final filesystem. Rotate everything you find, including database passwords and SSH keys.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Rebuild without the secret\u003C\u002Fstrong> and push a new tag. Old tags and digests that still contain the key must be deleted from the registry, or the key stays one \u003Ccode>docker pull\u003C\u002Fcode> away.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Record what was exposed and when\u003C\u002Fstrong>, so the next review has a starting point.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n\u003Cp>For the AI-key version of steps 2 and 3, see \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fblog\u002Fleaked-openai-or-anthropic-api-key-what-to-do-in-the-first-hour\u002F\">what to do in the first hour after a leaked key\u003C\u002Fa>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"stop-baking-secrets-in-three-rules\">Stop baking secrets in: three rules\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Col>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Nothing sensitive in the build context.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Add \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode>, credentials files and key files to \u003Ccode>.dockerignore\u003C\u002Fcode>.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>No secrets in \u003Ccode>ENV\u003C\u002Fcode> or \u003Ccode>ARG\u003C\u002Fcode>.\u003C\u002Fstrong> If a build step really needs a credential, use BuildKit secret mounts (\u003Ccode>RUN --mount=type=secret,...\u003C\u002Fcode>), which do not persist in the final image layers. See the Docker documentation for the syntax.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Inject at runtime.\u003C\u002Fstrong> The image holds code. Secrets arrive when the container starts, from outside.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n\u003Cp>Rule 3 is where people fall back to a \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> file next to the Compose file. That is the same leak waiting for a different mistake: the file gets committed, copied into an image, or pasted into chat. We built Ennote to remove this problem, and the next section shows how to do it for Docker.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"how-to-do-this-with-ennote\">How to do this with Ennote\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>At Ennote, we document three ways to give a container its secrets without a \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> file and without putting them in the image. The first two need the Ennote CLI only on the host that runs Docker. All commands below are from the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fguides\u002Fdocker\">Docker guide\u003C\u002Fa> and the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fquickstart\">CLI quickstart\u003C\u002Fa>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch3 id=\"step-1-store-the-secret-once\">Step 1: store the secret once\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\u003Cp>Sign in on your machine (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fauth\">\u003Ccode>ennote auth\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>). It opens your browser for SSO (OAuth 2.0 PKCE) and keeps the token in the OS keyring:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">ennote auth login\nennote config \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">set\u003C\u002Fspan> organization-\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">id\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">my\u003C\u002Fspan>-org-\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">id\u003C\u002Fspan>\nennote config \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">set\u003C\u002Fspan> workspace-\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">id\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">my\u003C\u002Fspan>-workspace-\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">id\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Create the secret. Piping through stdin keeps the values out of your shell history (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fcreate\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret create\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>):\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">cat .env | ennote secret create \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"app\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-class\">\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">type\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-title\">KEYS_VALUES\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Then delete the local \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode>. If your keys are in a password manager export, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fimport\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret import\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa> supports 1Password, LastPass and Bitwarden files, with \u003Ccode>--dry-run\u003C\u002Fcode> to preview.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch3 id=\"step-2-run-the-container-with-injected-secrets\">Step 2: run the container with injected secrets\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\u003Cp>Option 1, \u003Ccode>docker run\u003C\u002Fcode>. \u003Ccode>ennote secret get &lt;secret&gt; -- &lt;command&gt;\u003C\u002Fcode> starts the command with each key of the secret as an environment variable. \u003Ccode>-e NAME\u003C\u002Fcode> without a value copies that variable from the Docker CLI's environment into the container (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fget\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret get\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>):\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">ennote secret get app -- docker \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">run\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> --rm \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-e\u003C\u002Fspan> DB_PASSWORD \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-e\u003C\u002Fspan> API_KEY my-image\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Here \u003Ccode>app\u003C\u002Fcode> is a secret with the keys \u003Ccode>DB_PASSWORD\u003C\u002Fcode> and \u003Ccode>API_KEY\u003C\u002Fcode>. Per the docs, the values are never written to a file or typed on the command line.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Option 2, Docker Compose. List the keys under \u003Ccode>environment\u003C\u002Fcode> without values:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-yaml\">\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-symbol\">services:\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-symbol\">  api:\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-symbol\">    image:\u003C\u002Fspan> my-image\n\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-symbol\">    environment:\u003C\u002Fspan>\n      - DB_PASSWORD\n      - API_KEY\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">ennote secret \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">get\u003C\u002Fspan> app \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-comment\">-- docker compose up -d\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Option 3, the CLI as the entrypoint, for platforms that start containers for you and let you set environment variables but not wrap the start command:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-dockerfile\">\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">FROM\u003C\u002Fspan> alpine:\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-number\">3.20\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">RUN\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> apk add --no-cache curl \\\n &amp;&amp; curl \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-s\u003C\u002Fspan>SfL https:\u002F\u002Fget.ennote.io\u002Fget-cli.sh | sh\n\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">COPY\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> app \u002Fapp\n\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">ENTRYPOINT\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> [\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"ennote\"\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"secret\"\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"get\"\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"app\"\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"--\"\u003C\u002Fspan>]\n\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">CMD\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> [\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"\u002Fapp\u002Fserver\"\u003C\u002Fspan>]\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">docker \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">run\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"bash\"> --rm \\\n  \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-e\u003C\u002Fspan> ENNOTE_TOKEN \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-e\u003C\u002Fspan> ENNOTE_ORGANIZATION_ID=org_123 \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-_\">-e\u003C\u002Fspan> ENNOTE_WORKSPACE_ID=wrk_prod \\\n  my-image\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>The docs are explicit about the one trap here: never put \u003Ccode>ENNOTE_TOKEN\u003C\u002Fcode> in a Dockerfile (\u003Ccode>ENV\u003C\u002Fcode> or \u003Ccode>ARG\u003C\u002Fcode>), because it would be stored in the image layers. That is the mistake this article is about, with a different token. For automated environments the token is a machine identity token or Personal Access Token (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fauth\u002Fuser-tokens\">token guide\u003C\u002Fa>). You can create up to 10 active tokens, each must expire (1 hour up to a maximum of 30 days), and you can revoke one immediately from the dashboard.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>For Kubernetes, the docs point to the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fagent\u002F\">Ennote Kubernetes agent\u003C\u002Fa> instead, which syncs secrets into native Kubernetes Secrets.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch3 id=\"step-3-check-that-it-worked\">Step 3: check that it worked\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Run \u003Ccode>docker history my-image\u003C\u002Fcode> and \u003Ccode>docker run --rm my-image env\u003C\u002Fcode>. The first lists layer metadata and the second prints the environment baked into the image. Neither should show a key. If either does, it is still in the build.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Search the repository and build context for \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> files: \u003Ccode>git ls-files | grep -i env\u003C\u002Fcode> and a look at your \u003Ccode>.dockerignore\u003C\u002Fcode>.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Open the secret in the Ennote web app and look at its version history. Ennote saves a new version on every change, with timestamp and user, and you can \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecrets\u002Fversions\">revert\u003C\u002Fa> to an earlier one. So when you rotate a key after a leak, you can see which value was live when.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>On the Team plan, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Forganization\u002Faudit\u002Flogs\">audit logs\u003C\u002Fa> record secret creation, access, share, modification and deletion in shared workspaces (retention depends on plan; the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fsecret-manager\u002F\">secret manager page\u003C\u002Fa> lists 30 days for Team). You can \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Forganization\u002Faudit\u002Fnotifications\">get notified\u003C\u002Fa> about events.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Ch3 id=\"what-this-does-not-do\">What this does not do\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Our documentation describes no image or registry scanning, and Ennote does not revoke an AWS, OpenAI or Anthropic key at the provider. Steps 2 and 3 of the response order stay manual.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>It does not stop a mistake that bypasses it. If someone still hardcodes a key in a Dockerfile, the key is in the image. Pair Ennote with a secret scanner in CI, and see the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Foverview\">CLI overview\u003C\u002Fa> for how it fits in a pipeline.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Once the variables are inside a running container, the application and anyone with access to that container can read them. Limit who can run \u003Ccode>docker exec\u003C\u002Fcode> and \u003Ccode>docker inspect\u003C\u002Fcode> on your hosts.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>You can \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.ennote.io\u002F?utm_source=blog&amp;utm_medium=article&amp;utm_campaign=secrets-in-docker-images-stolen-in-seconds&amp;utm_content=inline\">create a free workspace\u003C\u002Fa> on the Developer plan to try the commands above.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"what-i-d-change-first\">What I'd change first\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If I had one afternoon: add \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> and key files to \u003Ccode>.dockerignore\u003C\u002Fcode>, grep every Dockerfile for \u003Ccode>ENV\u003C\u002Fcode> and \u003Ccode>ARG\u003C\u002Fcode> lines that hold credentials, and move the runtime secrets out of Compose files. Then scan the images you already pushed. An image you published months ago is as readable today as it was on day one.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"sources\">Sources\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>BleepingComputer, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com\u002Fnews\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcloud-keys-leaked-in-docker-hub-images-are-stolen-within-seconds\u002F\">Cloud keys leaked in Docker Hub images are stolen within seconds\u003C\u002Fa>, November 17, 2026\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Ennote documentation: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fguides\u002Fdocker\">Docker guide\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fquickstart\">CLI quickstart\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fget\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret get\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fcreate\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret create\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fauth\">\u003Ccode>ennote auth\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fauth\u002Fuser-tokens\">Personal Access Tokens\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecrets\u002Fversions\">Secret Versions\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Forganization\u002Faudit\u002Flogs\">Audit Logs\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>",[9,10,11,12,13,14],"docker","devsecops","secretmanagement","containersecurity","awssecurity","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1795122808284_Gemini_Generated_Image_id7invid7invid7i.jpeg?alt=media&token=03f7abb7-ad8b-42be-b7bd-186a42855814",1795122809791,"Secrets in Docker Images: Stolen in Seconds","Bots used keys from public Docker Hub images in 8 seconds. What the study found, what to do if a key shipped in an image, and how to avoid .env files",[20,25,30],{"title":21,"slug":22,"coverImage":23,"createdAt":24},"HashiCorp Vault vs. Infisical vs. Ennote: The Future of Kubernetes Secret Management","hashicorp-vault-vs-infisical-vs-ennote-the-future-of-kubernetes-secret-management","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1777266422787_wmremove-transformed%20(3).png?alt=media&token=fe8c588f-9c3e-4dbe-801b-b3fe5f314dd0",1777266425973,{"title":26,"slug":27,"coverImage":28,"createdAt":29},"5 Risky Ways Your Team Shares Secrets (And How to Stop Them)","5-risky-ways-your-team-shares-secrets-and-how-to-stop-them","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1777090988952_leaking-secrets.png?alt=media&token=8a6ada1e-2345-4254-8f36-250bbab97117",1777090991652,{"title":31,"slug":32,"coverImage":33,"createdAt":34},"Product Update:  Post-Quantum Cryptography meets \u003C1s Kubernetes Syncs","product-update-post-quantum-cryptography-meets-1s-kubernetes-syncs","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1779861206663_Gemini_Generated_Image_ghqtxxghqtxxghqt.png?alt=media&token=76222004-7015-4960-a8e1-29083eeb4ff9",1779860130922,1795122913522]