[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":36},["ShallowReactive",2],{"post-data-gitbook-breach-rotate-integration-tokens":3},{"post":4,"relatedPosts":20},{"id":5,"title":6,"content":7,"hashtags":8,"coverImage":15,"createdAt":16,"updatedAt":17,"seoTitle":18,"seoDescription":19},"U0lhgKLk4Kt4BBooPQRk","GitBook Breach: Which Tokens to Rotate and How to Check What Your Connected Tools Did","\u003Cp>GitBook says an attacker had access to its production environment on November 2 and 3, 2026. It says GitBook API tokens, integration tokens and secrets, and session signing secrets were accessible. If you use GitBook and need to rotate an API token after this breach, do four things. Create a new API token. Rotate the secrets of any tool or published integration connected to it. Regenerate your authenticated access signing key if you use a custom backend. Re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server. Then review the repositories GitBook was connected to, because GitBook says it cannot determine whether the attacker acted in them.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>This article is based on one source: GitBook's own incident post mortem, opened on November 16, 2026. I did not verify GitBook's account independently. I did not look at any customer's repositories. I describe how the attack worked only as far as GitBook wrote it, and where GitBook says it does not know something, I say so.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"what-did-gitbook-confirm-\">What did GitBook confirm?\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>From the post mortem, dated November 4, 2026 (20:30 CET):\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>On November 2, an attacker used a flaw in GitBook's SSO login flow to create sessions acting as GitBook staff. From there they queried the authentication information of a misconfigured GitHub App installed as an integration in GitBook's own organization. That gave them internal code repositories, and eventually a Cloudflare API key. The key led to production secrets and, through a service account, to full infrastructure access.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>The attacker had access to production for about 2 hours 45 minutes on the evening of November 2 and about 40 minutes early on November 3 (the post mortem gives the times).\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>GitBook went offline from 20:32 UTC on November 2 until 11:56 UTC on November 3, about 16 hours.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Customer data that was accessible: API tokens, integration tokens and secrets, session signing secrets, questions asked to GitBook Assistant by site visitors, and documentation sites using authenticated access. GitBook lists billing information, passwords and IP addresses as not compromised.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>GitBook says it rotated every secret in its infrastructure and every customer secret it manages, and invalidated API tokens issued before its final cutoff.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>GitBook says the attacker's activity looked aimed at one customer, and that it has no evidence any other customer's content was modified. It treats all customer data as exposed anyway.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>What GitBook says it does not know: whether the attacker took any action in customer repositories connected through GitHub or GitLab. It says the attacker could act as the GitBook app, but only in the repositories each customer had given the app access to.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>GitBook also says the attack pointed to automation and AI. That is GitBook's interpretation, and I would not build any decision on it. Your rotation list does not depend on how the attacker worked.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"why-this-one-is-about-your-integrations\">Why this one is about your integrations\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Most breach checklists say \"rotate everything.\" Here the useful question is narrower: which credentials did you hand to GitBook, and what can each one do on your side?\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>A token you gave a vendor is a credential for your systems, and it lives in the vendor's database. When the vendor is breached, you cannot see or control it. The only answer is to replace it. The same applies to the GitHub App or GitLab connection used for Git Sync: its reach is whatever repositories you granted.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>For a broader rotation method that is not specific to GitBook, see \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fblog\u002Frotate-environment-variables-after-platform-breach\u002F\">how to rotate all your environment variables after a platform breach\u003C\u002Fa>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"step-1-list-where-gitbook-credentials-live\">Step 1: list where GitBook credentials live\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Do this before you rotate anything. Rotating a token that five scripts use breaks five scripts, and you should know which ones.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Search your repositories, CI settings, deployment config and password manager for these:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Col>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>GitBook API tokens.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Anything calling the GitBook API: docs build scripts, sync jobs, internal tools. GitBook says it revoked all personal API tokens during the incident, so those already fail. Apps that use them need a new one.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Third-party tools connected to GitBook with an API token or secret.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Each one holds a credential that GitBook stored or used. List them.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Published GitBook integrations that use secrets.\u003C\u002Fstrong> If your team publishes an integration, its secrets are in scope.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Authenticated access with a custom backend.\u003C\u002Fstrong> The signing key lives in the GitBook app and in your backend.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>The GitBook MCP server.\u003C\u002Fstrong> GitBook asks you to re-authenticate it. If an AI assistant on a developer machine is configured with it, that includes those machines.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Git Sync with GitHub or GitLab.\u003C\u002Fstrong> GitBook says it rotated these keys for you and no action is needed. The connection still defines which repositories the app can reach, which matters in Step 3.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n\u003Cp>A starting search, adjusted to your own naming:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">git grep -n -\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-tag\">i\u003C\u002Fspan> -E \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"gitbook|GITBOOK_\"\u003C\u002Fspan> -- . \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">':!*.lock'\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>This finds references in code and config of the repository you run it in. It does not see CI variables, vendor dashboards or other people's machines, so check those by hand.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"step-2-rotate-in-this-order\">Step 2: rotate in this order\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>GitBook's own list is short. It comes from the post mortem plus the earlier November 3 update, which is where the MCP step comes from. I would work through it in this order, so nothing stays in the old state while you finish:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Col>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Create a new GitBook API token\u003C\u002Fstrong> and update every app from Step 1, item 1. Do this first because it unbreaks your own jobs.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Rotate the secrets of third-party tools\u003C\u002Fstrong> connected to GitBook, at the tool's own settings.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Rotate secrets of your published integrations.\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>If you use authenticated access with a custom backend:\u003C\u002Fstrong> regenerate the signing key in the GitBook app and put the new one into your backend.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server\u003C\u002Fstrong> on every machine that uses it.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n\u003Cp>GitBook's post mortem is not fully consistent about Git Sync. The \"what you need to do\" list says no action is needed for Git Sync (GitHub app) and GitLab, because GitBook rotated those keys. The customer-action summary in the same post mortem mentions reconnecting Git Sync and GitLab \"if applicable\". An earlier update also notes Git Sync was affected by an unrelated GitHub outage. If Git Sync shows an error on your side, ask GitBook support rather than guessing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Revoke the old value at the source each time. Replacing a token in your config does not invalidate the old one.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"step-3-review-what-the-connected-app-could-have-done\">Step 3: review what the connected app could have done\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>GitBook cannot say whether anything happened in your repositories. You can check, within what your Git host logs allow.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>First, scope: which repositories did you give the GitBook GitHub or GitLab app access to, and with what permission, read or write? If it was read-only, the review is short. If it could write, continue.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Look at the window GitBook gives, November 2 and 3 (UTC), with some margin:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-comment\"># commits on any branch in the window\u003C\u002Fspan>\ngit \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">log\u003C\u002Fspan> --all --since=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"2026-11-02\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">until\u003C\u002Fspan>=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"2026-11-04\"\u003C\u002Fspan> \\\n  --\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">format\u003C\u002Fspan>=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"%h %ad %an &lt;%ae&gt; %s\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --date=iso\n\n\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-comment\"># did anything touch CI workflows in the window?\u003C\u002Fspan>\ngit \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">log\u003C\u002Fspan> --all --since=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"2026-11-02\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">until\u003C\u002Fspan>=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"2026-11-04\"\u003C\u002Fspan> \\\n  --\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">format\u003C\u002Fspan>=\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"%h %ad %an %s\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --date=iso -- .github\u002Fworkflows .gitlab-ci.yml\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Commit author names and dates can be set by whoever pushes, so treat this as a first pass. The authoritative record is your Git host's audit log for the organization or group: look for activity by the GitBook app or by its connection in that window, and for changes to webhooks, deploy keys and app permissions.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Also search your logs, proxies and gateways for the three IP addresses GitBook lists as implicated:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-text\">94\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.183\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.188\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.91\u003C\u002Fspan>\n45\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.139\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.84\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.195\u003C\u002Fspan>\n198\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.251\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.83\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-selector-class\">.217\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>GitBook recommends reviewing your environments for these. A hit is worth escalating; no hit is not proof of nothing happening, because the attacker could have used other addresses.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>If you find unexplained commits or workflow changes, treat any secret reachable from those workflows as exposed and see \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fblog\u002Fleaked-openai-or-anthropic-api-key-what-to-do-in-the-first-hour\u002F\">what to do when a key leaks\u003C\u002Fa>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"step-4-keep-the-replacement-tokens-in-ennote\">Step 4: keep the replacement tokens in Ennote\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>This is where Ennote fits: a handful of integration tokens, spread across scripts and chat messages, that nobody can list during an incident. I'm describing what the documentation says the product does, and where it stops. Steps 1, 5 and 6 below need a plan with shared workspaces, audit logs and notifications. The docs list Team and Business, so check the pricing page for your plan.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. Make a shared workspace for the tokens.\u003C\u002Fstrong> In your organization open the workspaces list, click \"Add\", enter a name and description, and assign roles per user (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fcreate\">Create Workspace\u003C\u002Fa>). Shared workspaces have four roles: Admin, Editor, Viewer and Auditor. The Auditor sees the resources but not sensitive values (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fpermissions\">Workspace Permissions\u003C\u002Fa>). Shared workspaces are on the Team and Business plans. On the free Developer plan the site lists one workspace and 100 secrets (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fsecret-manager\u002F\">secret manager page\u003C\u002Fa>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. Store the new token as a Keys Values secret.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Pipe the value in on standard input so it does not stay in shell history (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fcreate\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret create\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>):\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">printf\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">'GITBOOK_API_TOKEN=%s\\n'\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-variable\">$NEW_TOKEN\u003C\u002Fspan>\"\u003C\u002Fspan> | ennote secret create \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"gitbook-api\"\u003C\u002Fspan> --type KEYS_VALUES --labels \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"gitbook,integration\"\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>Run \u003Ccode>ennote auth login\u003C\u002Fcode> first and pick your organization and workspace with \u003Ccode>ennote config set organization-id &lt;id&gt;\u003C\u002Fcode> and \u003Ccode>ennote config set workspace-id &lt;id&gt;\u003C\u002Fcode> (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fquickstart\">CLI quickstart\u003C\u002Fa>). The docs describe piping a \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> file into this command; the \u003Ccode>printf\u003C\u002Fcode> line is the same stdin pattern with one key.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>3. Use it without a \u003Ccode>.env\u003C\u002Fcode> file.\u003C\u002Fstrong> \u003Ccode>ennote secret get\u003C\u002Fcode> runs a command with the secret's keys as environment variables of that process only (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fcommands\u002Fsecret\u002Fget\">\u003Ccode>ennote secret get\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fa>):\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cpre>\u003Ccode class=\"lang-bash\">ennote secret \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-built_in\">get\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan class=\"hljs-string\">\"gitbook-api\"\u003C\u002Fspan> -- .\u002F\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">sync\u003C\u002Fspan>-docs.\u003Cspan class=\"hljs-keyword\">sh\u003C\u002Fspan>\n\u003C\u002Fcode>\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cp>In GitHub Actions, authenticate with a token stored as a repository secret and run the same command in a step (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fguides\u002Fgithub-actions\">GitHub Actions guide\u003C\u002Fa>). That guide says to create a Personal Access Token with an expiration. The token settings allow expirations from 1 hour up to 30 days (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fauth\u002Fuser-tokens\">Personal Access Tokens\u003C\u002Fa>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>4. Rotate again later without losing the old value.\u003C\u002Fstrong> When you change a secret, Ennote saves a new version with a timestamp and the user who made the change. You can view older versions and revert, and the old version stays in history (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecrets\u002Fversions\">Secret Versions\u003C\u002Fa>). The CLI can read a specific one with \u003Ccode>ennote secret get \"gitbook-api@2:GITBOOK_API_TOKEN\"\u003C\u002Fcode>. Version limits depend on your plan.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>5. See who read what.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Audit logs record sign-ins and secret creation, access, sharing, modification and deletion in shared workspaces, with user, IP address and device, and can be filtered by severity and date (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Forganization\u002Faudit\u002Flogs\">Audit Logs\u003C\u002Fa>). They are on the Team and Business plans, and retention depends on the plan.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>6. Get alerted.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Audit notifications go to Slack or Telegram. In the Notifications tab under Organization Audit settings, choose the channel, the event types, such as reading a sensitive secret or sharing a secret, and the severity levels (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Forganization\u002Faudit\u002Fnotifications\">Audit Notifications\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fdocs\u002Fintegration\u002Fnotification\u002Fslack\">Slack setup\u003C\u002Fa>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>How to check that it worked.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Run \u003Ccode>ennote secret get \"gitbook-api\" -- sh -c 'test -n \"$GITBOOK_API_TOKEN\" &amp;&amp; echo present'\u003C\u002Fcode> on a test machine and confirm it prints \u003Ccode>present\u003C\u002Fcode>. Then read the secret from the web app and confirm a new entry appears in the audit log. If the entry is missing, check the plan and that the secret is in a shared workspace: the audit log docs say events are recorded for shared workspaces only.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>What this does not do.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Ennote does not create or rotate a GitBook token for you; you generate it in GitBook. It does not review your repositories, and it would not have prevented GitBook's own breach. It gives you one place to see which tokens exist, who can read them, and what changed. That is the list Step 1 asks you to build by hand. Tokens you store in Ennote are only as safe as the access you give, and the docs recommend least privilege and regular role reviews.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>If you have the older tokens in a password manager export, the CLI can import 1Password, LastPass and Bitwarden files (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.ennote.io\u002Fcli\u002Fguides\u002Fimport\">import guide\u003C\u002Fa>, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fblog\u002Fimport-secrets-1password-lastpass-bitwarden-cli\u002F\">migration article\u003C\u002Fa>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>You can \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.ennote.io\u002F?utm_source=blog&amp;utm_medium=article&amp;utm_campaign=gitbook-breach-rotate-integration-tokens&amp;utm_content=inline\">create a free workspace\u003C\u002Fa> on the Developer plan to try the CLI steps.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"step-5-make-the-next-vendor-breach-smaller\">Step 5: make the next vendor breach smaller\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>GitBook's own lessons are three: every forgotten credential is a liability, response speed has to match attack speed, and SaaS vendors are part of their customers' security perimeter. For your side:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Give integrations the narrowest access.\u003C\u002Fstrong> A Git integration that only needs to read one docs repository should not have write access to ten.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Keep an owner and a list.\u003C\u002Fstrong> For each vendor token: who created it, where it is used, when it was last replaced.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Prefer expiring tokens\u003C\u002Fstrong> where the vendor allows it, and put a date on the rest.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Remove integrations you no longer use.\u003C\u002Fstrong> An unused connection is still a credential in someone else's database.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>For the same idea applied to API keys for AI services, see \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fennote.io\u002Fblog\u002Fleaked-openai-or-anthropic-api-key-what-to-do-in-the-first-hour\u002F\">what to do in the first hour after a key leaks\u003C\u002Fa>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2 id=\"sources\">Sources\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>GitBook, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gitbook.com\u002Fstatus\u002Fsecurity-incident-2026-11-03\">Security incident | November 2026 (post mortem and updates)\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Cp>&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>",[9,10,11,12,13,14],"gitbook","secretmanagement","devsecops","apitokens","incidentresponse","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1794854516883_Gemini_Generated_Image_e4u0t2e4u0t2e4u0.jpeg?alt=media&token=7adc1d28-129f-4143-91b5-03f3a714cdf3",1794854518362,1794854620095,"GitBook Breach: Rotate API Tokens and Integration Secrets","GitBook says API tokens and integration secrets were accessible on Nov 2. What to rotate, how to review connected repos, and where to keep the new tokens.",[21,26,31],{"title":22,"slug":23,"coverImage":24,"createdAt":25},"HashiCorp Vault vs. Infisical vs. Ennote: The Future of Kubernetes Secret Management","hashicorp-vault-vs-infisical-vs-ennote-the-future-of-kubernetes-secret-management","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1777266422787_wmremove-transformed%20(3).png?alt=media&token=fe8c588f-9c3e-4dbe-801b-b3fe5f314dd0",1777266425973,{"title":27,"slug":28,"coverImage":29,"createdAt":30},"5 Risky Ways Your Team Shares Secrets (And How to Stop Them)","5-risky-ways-your-team-shares-secrets-and-how-to-stop-them","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1777090988952_leaking-secrets.png?alt=media&token=8a6ada1e-2345-4254-8f36-250bbab97117",1777090991652,{"title":32,"slug":33,"coverImage":34,"createdAt":35},"Product Update:  Post-Quantum Cryptography meets \u003C1s Kubernetes Syncs","product-update-post-quantum-cryptography-meets-1s-kubernetes-syncs","https:\u002F\u002Ffirebasestorage.googleapis.com\u002Fv0\u002Fb\u002Fblog-01-c712e.firebasestorage.app\u002Fo\u002Fblog-covers%2F1779861206663_Gemini_Generated_Image_ghqtxxghqtxxghqt.png?alt=media&token=76222004-7015-4960-a8e1-29083eeb4ff9",1779860130922,1794854770572]